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Abstract
Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are being increasingly used in delivery, infrastructure surveillance, fire-
fighting, and agriculture. According to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the number of active small
commercial unmanned aircraft is going to grow from 385K in 2019 to 828K by 2024. UAS traffic management (UTM)
system for low-altitude airspace is therefore immediately necessary for its safe and high-density use. In this paper,
we propose the first formalization of FAA’s Concept of Operations for UTM for building and analyzing traffic
management protocols and systems. We formalize FAA’s notion of operation volumes that express aircraft intent in
terms of 4D blocks of airspace and associated real-time deadlines. We present a prototype coordination protocol using
operation volumes, involving participating aircraft and an airspace manager. We formally analyze the safe separation
and liveness properties of the protocol. Our analyses showcase how the de-conflicting and liveness of the system can
be proven assuming each aircraft conforms to the operation volume deadlines. Through extensive simulations we also
evaluate the performance of the protocol in terms of workload and response delays. Our experiments show that the
workload on the airspace manager and the response time of each aircraft grow linearly with respect to the number of
participating aircraft. The experiments also delineate the trade-off between performance, workload, and violation rate
across different strategies for generating operation volumes. Lastly, we implement a UTM violation detection and
resolution mechanism on top of our protocol. We include a simple fault injection technique that introduces failures
with different probabilities. We demonstrate how to use it to empirically evaluate the impact of aircraft failure on
the safety of surrounding aircraft, and how the performance of the airspace manager changes under different failure
probabilities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) is an ecosystem of technologies that will enable
unmanned, autonomous and human-operated, vehicles to be incorporated in a variety of services in transportation,
surveillance, and delivery. By 2024, 1.48 million of recreational and 828K of commercial unmanned aircraft are
expected to be flying in the national airspace [1]. Unlike the commercial airspace, this emerging area will have to
accommodate diverse and innovative vehicles relying on real-time distributed coordination, federated enforcement
of regulations, and lightweight training for safety. NASA, FAA, and their partners are investigating and prototyping
various UTM concepts, use cases, information architectures, and protocols that will enable large number of vehicles
to safely operate beyond visual line-of-sight. NASA was awarded the 2020 Government Invention of the Year for
its patent on UTM1.
Existing regulations do not cover fully autonomous air-vehicles, which is one of the goals of the UTM framework2
FAA’s Concept of Operations for UTM (ConOps Ver 2.0) [2] defines the basic principles for safe coordination in
UTM and the roles and responsibilities for the different parties involved such as the vehicle operator, manufacturer,
the airspace service provider, and the FAA. The document does not provide concrete protocols for de-conflicting
aircraft paths or rigorous analysis of UTM for safety or efficiency. UTM ConOps were successfully field tested
in Summer 2019 with different scenarios in three different sites in the US [3]. These early promising experiments
have created a need for formal safety analyses and larger scale empirical evaluations of the coordination protocols
with a larger number of aircraft in different types of scenarios.
1https://utm.arc.nasa.gov/index.shtml
2Amateur and commercial unmanned human-operated aircraft are regulated in PARTs 101 and 107 of https://www.faa.gov/uas/. These
regulations set the maximum vehicle speed, altitude, weight, minimum operator age, line-of-sight requirements, and requirements on operator’s
physical and mental health. They do not handle collision avoidance nor coordination.
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2UTM operations are managed through interactive planning and orchestration of intent information that enable
strategic (i.e., long term) de-confliction for multiple UAS. Intent sharing and strategic de-confliction reduce the need
for tactical separation management (see Section II) and reduce the likelihood of in-flight intent changes. A key
concept in ConOps is that the intent is expressed as operation volume segments which are 4D blocks of airspace
that have real-time specifications for entry and exit for the UAS. The ConOps report [2] describes how operation
volumes can be used for monitoring, de-conflicting, and operating UAS.
In this paper, we present an executable formal model inspired by the ConOps and study its safety, scalability,
and performance. To our knowledge, we are the first to formalize the notion of operation volumes and show how
intention expressed as operation volumes can be used for detecting anomalous behavior of air-vehicles and for
distributed de-conflicting. We then use a concrete representation of operation volumes to develop a de-conflicting
protocol. This baseline protocol precisely specifies the interaction between the participating agents (the aircraft),
with the airspace manager (the UAS service supplier in the UTM parlance). Our formal analyses of the safety and
liveness of this protocol illustrate how formal reasoning can be applied to the family of protocols using operation
volumes. Our safety analysis shows that the use of operation volumes helps decompose the global de-conflicting
of the UAS into local real-time requirements on each agent. We prove that the safety of the protocol is achieved
provided individual agents follow their declared operation volume. The liveness analysis further shows that every
agent can eventually find a non-conflicting operation volume, under a stricter set of assumptions.
We also present a open and flexible reference implementation of this protocol in a simulator (see Figure 1)
that can accommodate heterogeneous UAS. We use this simulator to perform detailed empirical analysis of the
UTM concepts and our de-conflicting protocol in a number of representative scenarios. Our experiment quantifies
the performance, workload, and violation rates of operation volumes, and we measure these metrics with respect
to the number of participating agents and different kinds of operation volumes. Our experiments suggest that
the computation load on the airspace manager scales linearly with the number of participating agents. They also
reaffirm the protocol’s safety and liveness guarantees. The overall performance of the UAS is determined by the
aggressiveness of each agent, i.e., the proposed operation volumes are more restrictive with tighter deadlines. We
compare two strategies, namely CONSERVATIVE and AGGRESSIVE, for generating operation volumes. The result
shows that AGGRESSIVE provides 1.5-3X speedup, but it also leads to 2-5X increased workload on the airspace
manager and up to 10% of violation rate.
Finally, we provide an implementation of UTM violation detection and resolution mechanism based on our
protocol with extra communication for reporting to the airspace manager, alerting possibly affected agents, and
re-planning with new operation volumes. We also develop a simple technique to introduce failures with different
probabilities. Our preliminary result shows that the number of all affected aircraft from a failure of one mainly
depends on the quality of the planned paths and physical distances between aircraft. It does not depend as much
on the total number of aircraft. We also show that the workload increases on the airspace manager with increasing
probability of failure due to the increased number of requests for new operation volumes when resolving violations.
II. RELATED WORK
Collision avoidance protocols: Prior to the development of the UTM ecosystem, traffic management protocols
for manned aircraft include the family of Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance Systems [4]. The development with
the Beacon Collision Avoidance System (BCAS) in the 1970, which was enhanced to become the Traffic Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS) in the 1990s; and the latest version is the Next-Generation Airborne Collision Avoidance
System (ACAS X) [5]. ACAS X includes separate protocols for large aircraft (ACAS Xa) and for unmanned vehicles
(ACAS Xu) [6], [7].
The ACAS family of protocols specify the sensors an aircraft should use to detect nearby aircraft and the sensing
strategy to be used. For example, active interrogation of intruder aircraft such as in TCAS and ACAS X, or passive
sensing as in BCAS. Second, the protocols specify the collision detection strategy which includes rules for how
future states of the involved aircraft are predicted. Finally, they specify the collision avoidance strategy using vertical
advisories for the aircraft such as “Do Not Climb” and “Climb with 1500 ft/min”. A survey of existing protocols
can be found in [8]. ACAS X is an optimized version of TCAS using dynamic programming. It minimizes the
number of alerts while not compromising the collision avoidance capability. The optimization is done offline and
its result, that maps states to advisories, is stored in large tables [9], and later in neural nets [6]. Several survey
articles cover these and other collision avoidance protocols air vehicles [10], [11].
Unlike ACAS, our protocol (in Section IV) is not designed to activate only for potential collision avoidance.
Our protocol is more aligned with the UTM vision and coordinates longer range strategic planning and ensures
safety against a wider range of hazards including loss of separation with other aircraft and static obstacles, weather
3Fig. 1. Visualization of two air-vehicles in a delivery-like scenario in a city block in our simulator. The operation volumes are
annotated with orange wireframes and the waypoints are shown in green.
events, and anomalous behaviors. Our framework and existing collision avoidance protocols, such as ACAS, would
complement each other. For instance, if an aircraft violates its operation volume in our protocol, then an ACAS-like
protocol can be used to avoid collision.
Formal approaches to UTM and collision avoidance: The formal methods research community has engaged
with the problem of air-traffic management in a number of different ways. There have been several works on formal
analysis of TCAS [12]–[15], ACAS X [16]–[18], and other protocols [19], [20]3. These verification efforts rely on
simplifying assumptions such as precise state estimates, straight-line uniform trajectories of aircraft for predicting
futures states, constant velocity of the intruder aircraft, and constant horizontal velocity of the ownership aircraft.
Methods for verifying and monitoring drones following specific protocols are developed in [20]–[25].
Synthesis algorithms for generating safe-by-construction plans for multiple drones flying in a shared airspace
have been developed in [21], [26]–[28]. Typically, these frameworks rely on predicting or communicating future
behavior of participating aircraft while accounting for different sources of uncertainty whether in state estimates or
from disturbances and modeling errors. For example, [22] uses reachability analysis to check for collisions while
accounting for sensing and synchronization errors. The paper [26] uses Signal Temporal Logic (STL) to synthesize
trajectories that are far from the communicated future trajectories of other drones. It accounts for discretization errors
of continuous trajectories while restricting them to be simple (straight lines, or with free end velocities but zero
acceleration). The paper [21] synthesizes safe drone trajectories given those of the other drones while accounting
for synchronization errors. Our contributions are complementary to the synthesis approaches that generate mutually
disjoint plans. In [29], the authors present an approach for decentralized policy synthesis for route planning of
individual vehicles modeled as Markov decision processes. Our approach decouples the low-level, dynamically
feasible planning from the distributed coordination, and solves the latter problem using a centralized coordinator
(airspace manager) that performs distributed mutual exclusion over different parts of the airspace (Section IV).
III. OPERATION VOLUMES
In this section, we formalize the notion of operating volumes introduced in ConOps [2]. We refer to an UAS
participating in the UTM system as an agent and the physical device of the UAS as air-vehicle. Every agent in the
system has a unique identifier. The set of all possible identifiers is ID . We assume that each agent has access to
a common global clock which takes non-negative real numbers. The relevant part of the airspace is modeled as a
3https://ti.arc.nasa.gov/news/acasx-verification-software/
4compact subset X ⊆ R3. The airspace is different from the state space of individual air-vehicles which may have
many other state components like velocity, acceleration, pitch and yaw angles, etc.
Informally, an operating volume contract (OVC) is a schedule for an air-vehicle for occupying airspace. By
publishing an OVC, an agent makes its intentions known.
Definition 1. A operating volume contract (OVC) is a finite sequence of pairs C = (R1, T1), (R2, T2), . . . , (Rk, Tk)
where each Rj ⊆ X is a compact subset of the airspace, and Tj’s is a monotonically increasing sequence of time
points.
The total time duration Tk−T1 of the OVC C is denoted by C.dur , and the length k of C is denoted by C.len .
We denote the set of all possible contracts as OV.
An air-vehicle meets an OVC at real-time t if (i) t ∈ [Ti, Ti+1) for any i < k implies that the air-vehicle is
located within Ri, and (ii) t > Tk implies that the air-vehicle is located within Rk. In other words:
Definition 2. Any OVC C represents a compact subset JCK of space-time:
JCK , k−1⋃
i=1
{(r, t) | r ∈ Ri ∧ Ti ≤ t < Ti+1}
∪ {(r, t) | r ∈ Rk ∧ Tk ≤ t}
It is straightforward that JCK = ∅ if and only if Ri = ∅ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. And, given the current position pos and
clock reading clk of an air-vehicle, we say that the air-vehicle meets the contract C if and only if (pos, clk) ∈ JCK.
In the above definition, we purposefully identify the name of the OVC C with the space-time volume it represents.
Large airspaces may have to be divided into several smaller airspaces and one has to deal with hand-off across
airspaces. In this paper, we do not handle this problem of air-vehicles entering and leaving X .
Definition 3. Given any OVC C = (R1, T1), . . . , (Rk, Tk), we define prepend(C, Tpp) where Tpp < T1, split(C, Tsp)
where Ti < Tsp < Ti+1, and append(C, Tap) where Tk < Tap,
prepend(C, Tpp) ,(∅, Tpp), (R1, T1), . . . , (Rk, Tk)
split(C, Tsp) ,(R1, T1), . . . , (Ri, Ti), (Ri, Tsp),
(Ri+1, Ti+1), . . . , (Rk, Tk)
append(C, Tap) ,(R1, T1), . . . , (Rk, Tk), (Rk, Tap)
Finally, we define insert(C, T ) function over any T ,
insert(C, T ) ,

prepend(C, T ) if T < T1
split(C, T ), if Ti < T < Ti+1
append(C, T ) if Tk < T
C, otherwise.
Notice that by definition the OVC produced by split, append, and insert functions represents the same set of
space-time by C. With the help of insert, we can always align a OVC with a given sequence of time points. We
can then implement intersection, union, and difference on OVCs on top of the same operators for airspace.
Definition 4. Given two OVCs with aligned time points, Ca = (Ra1 , T1), . . . , (Rak, Tk), Cb = (Rb1, T1), . . . , (Rbk, Tk),
and a set operation ⊕ ∈ {∩,∪, \},
Ca ⊕ Cb , (Ra1 ⊕Rb1, T1), . . . , (Rak ⊕Rbk, Tk).
Proposition 1. Given any OVC C, any time point T , any set operation ⊕ ∈ {∩,∪, \}, we have the following
equivalences: Jinsert(C, T )K = JCKJCa ⊕ CbK = JCaK⊕ JCbK.
The proof is to trivially expand the definition of JCK and skipped here. Given Proposition 1, OVCs are closed
under all set operations; hence we drop the J·K notation in the later sections. Several concepts are therefore defined
5naturally in OVCs as set operations. For example, checking if a OVC Ca refines Cb is to simply check if Ca uses
less space-time than Cb does, i.e., Ca ⊆ Cb, or equivalently Ca \ Cb = ∅.
IV. A SIMPLE COORDINATION PROTOCOL USING OVCS
We present a simple protocol for safe traffic management using OVCs and its correctness argument. The core
of the protocol is based on distributed mutual exclusion over parts of the airspace using contracts. The protocol
involves a set of agents interacting with an airspace manager or controller (AM). That is, the overall system is the
parallel composition of the airspace manager (AM) and all agents (Agenti):
Sys , AM ||{Agent i}i∈ID .
In Section IV-A, we first describe the protocol under the assumption that the agents and the manager interact
through reliable request and reply messages, which are delivered instantly and modeled here by discrete
transitions for simplicity. We then analyze the correctness of the protocol under instant delivery as well as bounded
communication delay in Section IV-C.
A. Airspace Manager
We design the airspace manager as the automaton defined in Figure 2. The AM keeps track of all contracts and
checks for conflicts before approving new contracts. It uses a mapping contr_arr in which contr_arr[i]
records the contract held by agent i, and a set reply_set to store the agents whose requests are processed and
pending reply.
1 automaton AirspaceManager
2
3 variables:
4 contr_arr: [ID → OV]
5 reply_set: Set〈ID〉
6
7 input requesti(contr: OV)
8 eff:
9 reply_set := reply_set ∪ {i}
10 if contr ∩ (
j∈ID⋃
j 6=i
contr_arr[j]) = ∅:
11 contr_arr[i] := contr_arr[i] ∪ contr
12
13 output replyi(contr: OV = contr_arr[i])
14 pre: i ∈ reply_set
15 eff: reply_set := reply_set \ {i}
16
17 input releasei(contr: OV)
18 eff: contr_arr[i] := contr_arr[i] \ contr
Fig. 2. Airspace Manager automaton
Whenever AM receives a requesti(contr) from agent i (line 7), agent i is first added to reply_set. Then,
contr is checked against all contracts of other agents by checking disjointness (line 10). If the check succeeds,
then it is approved and included in contr_arr[i] via set union (line 11). Otherwise, nothing is changed.
When reply_set is not empty and contains agent i, AM triggers the replyi(contr) action to reply to agent
i with its new contract contr=contr_arr[i] (line 13). Note that AM replies with contr_arr[i] in line 13
no matter whether the requested contract contr in line 7 was approved or not (i.e. irrespective of whether contr
in line 7 was included in contr_arr[i] or not). Finally, if AM receives a releasei(contr), then it removes
contr from contr_arr[i] via set difference (line 18).
B. Agent Protocol
The agent’s coordination protocol sits in between a high-level planner/navigator that generates the waypoints
and a low-level controller that drives the air-vehicle to the target waypoints. A simplified state diagram of the agent
protocol is shown in Figure 3. At a high level, agent i’s protocol starts in the idle state and initiates when a plan
action with a given set of waypoints is triggered by the agent’s planner. Then, the protocol computes a contract
needed for visiting the waypoints, requests this contract from the AM, and waits for the reply. If the contract is
granted by the AM’s reply, the agent protocol enters the moving state. At this point the agent’s controller starts
6IDLE start
REQUESTING
WAITING
MOVING
RELEASING
plan(waypoints)
requesti(contr)
replyi(contr)
next_region
succeed fail
releasei(contr)
replyi
Fig. 3. Simplified state diagram for Agent.
moving the air-vehicle, ideally, satisfying the contract. Once the air-vehicle reaches the last waypoint successfully,
the protocol releases the contract and goes back to idle state.
In the case that the requested contract is not granted by the AM, the protocol directly releases and retries. If the
agent fails to comply to the contract while moving, it then notifies AM that it violated its contract. Moreover, it
plans for recovery. We will discuss this further in Section VI.
The detailed automaton is shown in Figure 4. The agent protocol has a status variable to keep track of
the discrete states in Figure 3. In addition, it uses three contract-typed variables for the following purposes:
(1) curr_contr is a local copy of the current contract maintained for i by AM, (2) plan_contr is a contract
that i wants to propose to AM to be able to visit the planned waypoints, and (3) free_contr tracks the releasable
portion of the current contract curr_contr. In addition, the agent i can read its current position from the variable
pos and the current global time from the variable clk. To provide a simple abstraction of arbitrary controllers for
the agent, we create the variable traj_ctrl that stores a list of waypoints that the agent would follow when it
is in the MOVING status. traj_ctrl has two abstract interfaces: set_waypoints to store the plan waypoints
and calculate the necessary control signal (using PID, for example) and start to start moving the agent to follow
the stored list of waypoints.
Each agent i is initialized in IDLE status. When it receives a plan action with given waypoints (line 13), it
uses waypoints2contract(pos, waypoints) to create a contract representing the airspace that it may visit
when following the waypoints starting from its current position, stores it as plan_contr (line 16), stores the
waypoints in traj_ctrl (line 17), and enters the REQUESTING status (line 18). A number of strategies may
be followed to create contracts from waypoints lists, for example using reachability analysis for a given waypoint-
tracking controller for the aircraft, or creating fixed-sized 3D rectangles centered at the segments connecting the
waypoints. We will discuss this further in Section V. Agent i then makes a request requesti(contr) with
contr=plan_contr to denote the planned contract is sent as output, and enters WAITING status to wait for a
reply from the AM (line 20).
When agent i receives a replyi(contr) from AM, the contract contr represents the contract of agent i
recorded by AM (line 24). It is the union of all contracts agent i have acquired and not yet released. Agent i first
checks whether the contract curr_contr is a subset of contr or not. If not, it means the local copy is less
restrictive, so AM may grant contracts to other agents conflicting with agent i. This may lead to a safety violation,
and hence agent i raises a warning (line 24). Otherwise, the agent checks if the contract contr approved by the
AM contains plan_contr, i.e. plan_contr ⊆ contr (line 31). If yes, then it updates its curr_contr to
be equal to the new approved contr. The agent then calls traj_ctrl.start to start following the waypoints,
and transitions to the MOVING status. If no, i.e. there is a part of plan_contr that is not approved contr and
not approved by the AM, then agent i does not change curr_contr. It only checks the part of the contract saved
by the AM that is no longer a part of curr_contr of the agent. It then stores this portion of the contract in
free_contr (line 36), and directly goes to the RELEASING status to release and re-plan (line 37).
When the agent is in the MOVING status, the next_region action will be triggered whenever the global time
passes the time bound of a region in the contract (line 39). That action will remove that pair of region and time
point from plan_contr (line 42). Once there is only a single pair left in the planned contract plan_contr and
the contract is not violated, the succeed action is triggered to indicate the plan is executed successfully (line 44).
71 automaton Agenti
2 variables:
3 // Discrete variables
4 status: {IDLE, REQUESTING, WAITING, MOVING, RELEASING} := IDLE
5 curr_contr: OV
6 plan_contr: OV
7 free_contr: OV
8 // Continuous variables
9 clk: T≥0
10 pos: R3 // Position sensor
11 traj_ctrl // Trajectory control
12
13 internal plan(waypoints: List〈R3〉)
14 pre: status = IDLE ∧ len(waypoints) ≥ 1
15 eff:
16 plan_contr := waypoints2contract(pos, waypoints, clk)
17 traj_ctrl.set_waypoints(waypoints)
18 status := REQUESTING
19
20 output requesti(contr: OV = plan_contr)
21 pre: status = REQUESTING
22 eff: status := WAITING
23
24 input replyi(contr: OV)
25 eff:
26 if status = WAITING:
27 if curr_contr 6⊆ contr:
28 warning(‘‘Acquired contract cannot sustain current contract’’)
29 curr_contr := contr
30
31 if plan_contr ⊆ contr:
32 curr_contr := contr
33 traj_ctrl.start()
34 status := MOVING
35 else:
36 free_contr := contr \ curr_contr
37 status := RELEASING
38
39 internal next_region():
40 pre: status = MOVING ∧ len(plan_contr) ≥ 2
41 ∧ clk ≥ plan_contr.T2
42 eff: plan_contr.pop_front()
43
44 internal succeed():
45 pre: status = MOVING ∧ len(plan_contr) = 1
46 ∧ (pos, clk) ∈ plan_contr
47 eff:
48 free_contr := curr_contr \ plan_contr
49 status := RELEASING
50
51 internal fail():
52 pre: status = MOVING ∧ (pos, clk) /∈ curr_contr
53 eff:
54 error(‘‘Current contract is violated’’)
55
56 output releasei(contr: OV = free_contr)
57 pre: status = RELEASING
58 eff:
59 curr_contr := curr_contr \ free_contr
60 status := IDLE
Fig. 4. Agent automaton
Agent i then calculates the releasable contract free_contr to be its contract curr_contr excluding the last
pair of plan_contr (line 48). Finally, it enters RELEASING status. It sends releasei(contr) to notify AM
the contract that agent i can release, and goes back to IDLE status (line 60).
If at any point in time the current contract is violated, the fail action would be triggered (line 51). Remember
that the contract is violated if the current pair of position and time of the agent is outside of the space-time specified
by the contract. This can happen in case the agent moves outside a region in a time interval of the contract, or the
agent could not reach a region before its specified time point in the contract. It then declares a violation to AM
then re-plans for recovery. We will discuss this further in Section VI.
8C. Protocol correctness: safety and liveness
We now discuss the safety property ensured by the protocol shown in the previous section. Here, we denote
curr_contr of the ith agent by agent i.curr contr. Assuming that none of the agents triggered their fail
action, then they always follows their local contracts curr_contr’s. In that case, collision avoidance is defined
naturally as the disjointness between the curr_contr’s of all agents. Our goal therefore is to show that the
following proposition is an invariant of the system:
Proposition 2. If none of the agents triggered their fail action, the current contracts followed by all agents are
pairwise disjoint, i.e., ∧
i∈ID
∧
j 6=i,j∈ID
agent i.curr contr ∩ agentj .curr contr = ∅.
Our proof strategy is to show that first the global record of contracts maintained by AM are pairwise disjoint.
Then, we ensure the local copy by each agent is as restrictive as the global record and hence preserves disjointness.
We start from an auxiliary invariant about AM.
Proposition 3. If none of the agents triggered their fail action, all contracts recorded by AM are pairwise disjoint,
i.e., ∧
i∈ID
∧
j 6=i,j∈ID
AM.contr arr[i] ∩AM.contr arr[j] = ∅.
This is a direct result from examining all actions of AM automaton. The requesti action ensures that a contr
is only included into contr_arr[i] if it is disjoint with all other contr_arr[j]. The replyi action does not
modify contr_arr at all, and releasei action only shrinks the contracts.
Now we argue that the local copy is always as restrictive as the global record.
Proposition 4. If none of the agents triggered their fail action, the local curr_contr of agent i is always as
restrictive as contr_arr[i], i.e.,∧
i∈ID
agent i.curr contr ⊆ AM.contr arr[i].
This is also straightforward by examining all actions of agent automaton regardless of the order of execution.
The curr_contr is only modified in reply and release actions. In reply action, curr_contr is assigned
with contr sent by AM and thus preserves Proposition 4. In release action, curr_contr removes contr
first, and AM has to wait until release is delivered to remove contr. As a result, it also preserves Proposition 4.
With Proposition 3 and Proposition 4 being true, it is straightforward that Proposition 2 is implied using basic set
theory.
To further extend the proof with communication delay in consideration, we first observe that Proposition 3 is
a local invariant for AM; thus communication delay does not invalidate the proof. We therefore simply revisit
the proof for Proposition 4. Because the current contract of each agent is only updated after receiving replyi
from AM and shrunk when sending releasei, the potential counterexample shown in Figure 5 can only happen
if replyi is delivered to agent i to update its local copy while releasei is delivered to AM to shrink the
global copy concurrently, i.e., T rel0 < T
rep
1 and T
rep
0 < T
rel
1 . It is easy to see discrete transitions will prevent
this counterexample as an action must be finished before another action. Our proof is to show the impossibility of
this counterexample under the reliable communication with bounded delay. Recall Figure 3, our protocol ensures
requesti, replyi, and releasei happen in such order by design. We can prove this order of actions by
induction on the formally defined automaton but skip the proof here for simplicity. Therefore, we know that ther
must be a requesti sent after releasei, and replyi is the response to this request. Now we provide a simplified
reliable communication assumption for this proof.
Assumption 1. The reliable communication guarantees the messages sent by the same agent is delivered in order.
In particular, if agent i sends a releasei first and requesti second, we denote T
rel
0 as the time releasei is
sent and T rel1 as the time received, similarly T
req
0 and T
req
1 for requesti. Formally,
T rel0 ≤ T req0 ⇒ T rel1 ≤ T req1
Also by definition, T ∗0 ≤ T ∗1 because sending must happen before receiving. The order between actions can
be formally specified as T rel0 ≤ T req0 ≤ T req1 ≤ T rep0 because the request must have been delivered to AM
for it to trigger the replyi. We can then derive T rel0 ≤ T req0 ≤ T req1 ≤ T rep0 < T rel1 . This contradicts to our
9assumption of reliable communication because messages from agent i are delivered out of order. To be more precise,
releasei is sent before (T rel0 ≤ T req0 ) but delivered later (T req1 < T rel1 ) than requesti. This contradicts to
T rel0 ≤ T req0 ⇒ T rel1 ≤ T req1 . Hence, we prove by contradiction.
agenti
curr_contr=C0
AM
contr_arr[i]=C0
T rel0
T
rep
1
T
rep
0
T rel1
releasei(C1) rep
lyi(C0
)
curr_contr=C0\C1
curr_contr=C0 contr_arr[i]=C0\C1
Fig. 5. Sequence diagram for an impossible unsafe OVC release. By definition, T rel0 ≤ T rel1 and T req0 ≤ T req1
For liveness property, we would like to see every agent follows its waypoints and eventually reaches the last
waypoint. In our protocol, this is formulated as every agent eventually reaches the last region of its plan_contr
and triggers its succeed action. It is worth noting that the liveness property depends on the given waypoints for
each agent and the strategy to convert waypoints to contracts. Some simple scenarios where liveness cannot be
achieved are when two agents are given some waypoints that are very close. The last region where one agent stays
at the end could block the other agent forever. Therefore, we discuss liveness property under following assumptions.
Assumption 2 (single goal (list of waypoints) per agent). For each agent i ∈ ID , there is a single list of waypoints
wpsi left to follow before it stops and land. Hence, once a contract for wpsi sent by agent i is accepted by AM,
whether it failed or succeeded in following, it does not send another one again.
Assumption 3 (disjointness of other agents’ OVCs from an agent’s initial OVC and final destination). ∀ clk1, clk2 ∈
R≥0, ∀ posi ∈ curr contri.dest .P, posj ∈ curr contrj.dest .P ,∧
i
∧
j 6=i
waypoints2contract(posi,wpsi, clk1).P ∩
(
waypoints2contract(posj,wpsj, clk2).dest .P ∪
curr contrj.dest .P
)
= ∅.
Now, let us define
τi = max
posi∈curr contri.dest.R,
clki∈R≥0
waypoints2contract(posi,
wpsi , clki).dur . (1)
A τi is the maximum duration of a planned contract that would be generated starting from any position in the last
region of the initial contract curr contri.dest .P at any time by the ith agent.
Proposition 5 (liveness). If none of the agents triggered their fail action and Assumptions 2 and 3 are satisfied,
then the maximum time before all agents get their planned contracts for the lists of waypoints {wpsi}i∈ID accepted
by AM is
∑
i∈ID curr contri.dur + τi.
Proof. Initially, the array contr arr of the air manager AM stores the initial contracts {curr contri}i∈ID of all
agents. Now, assume that as time passed, 0 ≤ k < |ID | agents got their planned contracts of the lists of waypoints
{wps} accepted by AM, and thus saved in its contr arr. We call this set of agents AccAgents . Let j ∈ ID be an
agent that either did not send a new planned contract to AM yet, or have sent one or more but none got accepted.
Agent j might 1) violate its current contract curr contr, 2) continue following curr contr till its last region,
trigger the succeed action, and transition to RELEASING status, or 3) be in the IDLE status where it sends another
contract to AM. If agent j violated its contract, it would trigger its fail action, which violates the hypothesis of the
proposition. If agent j stayed MOVING till the action succeed is triggered, it will transition first to the RELEASING,
then to the IDLE status. Reaching the IDLE status or triggering the fail action would take at most curr contrj .dur
time. If agent j is IDLE, it will send the planned contract waypoints2contract(posj,wpsj, clkj) to AM, where
its position posj ∈ curr contrj.dest .P . AM in turn would reject the sent contract if it intersects one of the
contracts in contr arr, or accept it, otherwise. If AM rejects it, then it would accept a future version of it. That
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is because in the future, the only physical space reserved for AccAgents would be the last regions of their planned
contracts. Based on Assumption 3, the planned contract of agent j is disjoint from these regions. No agent in
AccAgents that succeeds would send a contract again to AM because of Assumption 2. Those that violate their
contracts instead, would trigger the fail action and thus are not considered in this proposition. If there is no
agent that is not in AccAgents that sent its contract to AM and got accepted before that of agent j did, none of
the contracts in contr arr would intersect its sent contract because of Assumption 3. Moreover, it would take
a maximum of τAccAgents = maxh∈AccAgents contr arr[h].dur for the all AccAgents to succeed or fail. Thus,
it would take a maximum of curr contrj.dur + τAccAgents time for an extra agent to get its contract accepted.
Therefore, the theorem.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Our experiment is conducted in the Gazebo and ROS-based simulation framework from [28] We choose the
Hector Quadrotor model [30] integrated in the framework with its default controller to support trajectory control.
In this section, we first describe the scenarios used in our experiment and present the result followed by a brief
discussion.
A. Evaluation scenarios
Following the protocol defined in Section IV, a scenario for evaluation is specified by (1) the set of agents ID
whichwe only consider #A = |ID | (2) the world map and the predefined sequence of waypoints for each agent
denoted as the map, and (3) the strategy waypoints2contract the agents use to to generate OVCs from their
waypoints. For example, the Left figure in Figure 9 shows a scenario with #A = 6 drones in the CORRIDOR map.
It uses AGGRESSIVE strategy to generate OVCs visualized as the red and blue frames.
We evaluate our protocol in the following maps shown in Figure 9:
(1) CORRIDOR simulates two sets of drones on the opposite sides of a tight air corridor trying to pass through.
This may happen in a garage like space where a fleet of air-vehicle enter or leave.
(2) LOOP simulates each drone following the vertices of the same closed polygonal chain. This models common
segments in the routes for all air-vehicles such as pickup packages or return to base.
(3) RANDOMN are sequences of N − 1 random points inside a 25m× 25m arena for each drone to follow. This
is to validate the robustness of our protocol through random testing.
(4) CITYSIM is the map in Figure 1 that simulates a city block.
In addition, a designated landing spot for each drone is specified as the last waypoint in all maps to ensure the
liveness property. This avoids the situation where a landed drone blocks other air-vehicles.
Fig. 6. Regions for waypoints generated by AGGRESSIVE (Solid rectangles) and CONSERVATIVE (Dashed rectangles) strategies.
CONSERVATIVE and AGGRESSIVE operation volumes: We implement two strategies, namely CONSERVATIVE
and AGGRESSIVE, for generating OVCs from given waypoints and positions. Both strategies are deterministic and
use only hyper-rectangles for specifying regions in OVCs. We skip the implementation details and only give the
high-level ideas here. Figure 6 depicts the intuition behind the two strategies. CONSERVATIVE simply reserves large
rectangles covering consecutive waypoints with longer durations between time points. As a result, it is less likely
to violate a given OVC, but it may acquire unnecessarily large volumes and may obstruct other agents. In contrast,
AGGRESSIVE heuristically selects smaller rectangles and shorter durations based on the physical dynamics of the
air-vehicle. Therefore, AGGRESSIVE is less likely to block other agents, but the resulting OVC is more likely to be
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Fig. 7. Response time per agent for each map using CONSERVATIVE strategy: Max. (Solid marks and lines) and Avg. (Hollow marks and
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Fig. 8. Number of emptiness queries (Left) by AM and rectangles checked (Right) per second using CONSERVATIVE strategy.
violated. AGGRESSIVE also increases the workload of AM because the operating volume to be checked (number
of rectangles) can be more complex.
B. Experimental results
Setup: The simulation experiments discussed here were conducted on a machine with 4 CPUs at 3.40GHz,
8GB main memory, and a NVidia GeForce GTX 1060 3GB video card. The software platform is Ubuntu 16.04
LTS with ROS Kinetic and Gazebo 9. For the reported time usage, we report the simulation time from Gazebo
(time elapsed in the simulated model), instead of wall clock time. This helps reduce the variations in the results
due to different computing hardware and effects of concurrency in simulating multiple agents. To address the
nondeterminism arising from concurrency, we simulate each scenario three times, and report the average value of
each metric.
Response time and workload: Figure 7 shows the response time for each drone starting from sending the first
request to finish traversing all waypoints using CONSERVATIVE strategy in CORRIDOR, LOOP, and RANDOMN
maps. As expected, the maximum response time per agent grows linearly with respect to the number of participating
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Fig. 9. Maps: CORRIDOR (Left), LOOP (Mid), RANDOMN (Right)
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF SIMULATION TIME AND VIOLATION RATE BETWEEN CONSERVATIVE AND AGGRESSIVE.
CONSERVATIVE AGGRESSIVE Increased
Map #A Time(s) #Rect/s %F Time(s) #Rect/s %F Speedup #Rect/s
2 27.52 0.00 0% 21.30 0.00 0% 1.29X N/A
4 39.78 2.99 0% 27.24 6.16 3.57% 1.46X 2.71X
CORRIDOR 6 51.63 7.02 0% 34.14 14.10 2.38% 1.51X 2.06X
8 64.18 10.68 0% 37.91 22.13 2.80% 1.69X 2.01X
10 95.47 12.97 0% 41.94 35.14 2.24% 2.28X 2.07X
2 91.05 1.91 0% 37.63 6.85 4.53% 2.42X 3.59X
4 184.88 5.77 2.08% 70.89 23.33 1.77% 2.61X 4.04X
LOOP 6 280.51 10.26 5.56% 103.28 40.52 7.34% 2.72X 3.95X
8 379.53 14.28 7.29% 134.62 63.71 8.01% 2.82X 4.46X
10 485.58 18.26 5.83% 169.25 90.94 9.48% 2.87X 4.98X
CITYSIM 2 77.42 1.77 0% 49.92 4.48 1.19% 1.55X 2.53X
#A is the number of agents, Time(s) is the total time for simulation according to the simulated clock in seconds, #Rect/s is the number of
rectangles per second in OVCs which AM has to check the disjointness of, and %F is the violation rate.
agents. This is because in the worst case, all agents are sequentially accessing the shared narrow air-corridor, and
the last agent has to wait until all other agents finish traversing. The average response time shows that it is possible
to finish faster if agents can execute concurrently when they request disjoint airspaces. For example, the average
time for 10 agents is smaller the time for 8 agents in RANDOM6.
To estimate the workload for AM under the simulated clock, in Figure 8 we report the number of queries to
OVCs by AM. We consider both the number of emptiness/disjointness queries (denoted as #Qe) and the total number
of hyper-rectangles to check (denoted as #Rect) per second. Because the check of disjointness between two 3D
hyper-rectangles is a constant number of comparisons. #Rect provides a more precise estimation of computation
resources needed at the AM than #Qe. The growth of #Qe as expected is roughly quadratic against #A in the worst
scenario because of the check for pairwise disjointness. However, the growth of #Rect is not as fast and seemingly
linear to #A in the worst scenario. Therefore, it is very likely the workload of AM increases only linearly instead of
quadratically with more agents when we use simple representation of operating volumes such as hyper-rectangles.
CONSERVATIVE vs. AGGRESSIVE: We compare the time as well as the rate of violations between CONSER-
VATIVE and AGGRESSIVE strategies in the CORRIDOR, LOOP, and CITYSIM from Figure 1 in Section I. Due
to the heavier demand for computational resources required, we only simulated with two drones for CITYSIM.
The violation rate (%F) is defined as the percent of rectangles in OVC the agent failed to stay within, during
waypoint traversal. This is calculated by first counting the rectangles when a fail action happens and dividing
it with the total number of rectangles in OVC. Table I shows that AGGRESSIVE strategy can reduce the overall
response time and provide 1.3-2.8X speedup. Specifically, AGGRESSIVE strategy can lead to higher speedups with
larger number of particiating agents. However, AGGRESSIVE can also cause almost 10% of violations in the LOOP
scenario. In terms of workload, it doubles the number of rectangles for AM to process. This experiment shows that
our framework is suitable for comparing and quantifying the trade-off between performance, safety, and workload
under different OVCs generation strategies.
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TABLE II
COMPARISON OF SIMULATION TIME AND AGENTS NOTIFICATION RATE BETWEEN DIFFERENT FAULT PROBABILITIES AND DIFFERENT
NUMBERS OF AGENTS.
Failure Prob. #A Resp. T.(s) #Rect/s %F #notif./F
0.4 4 35.44 2.49 33.12% 0.43
6 44.53 4.88 36.25% 0.42
0.9 4 54.73 1.56 74.38% 0.17
6 54.81 4.44 72.92% 0.42
Failure Prob. is the probability to instrument waypoints outside of an agent’s OVC, #A is the number of agents, Resp. T.(s) is the average
response time per agent, #Rect/s is the number of rectangles per second in OVCs which AM has to check the disjointness of, %F is the
violation rate, and #notif./F is the number of alert notifications sent to agents per violation.
VI. FAILURES AND MONITORING
Failures in UTM: In UTM, aircraft operators are responsible on ensuring that they abide their volume contracts,
or according to our notation, their OVCs. When a failure causes the aircraft to violate its contract, it should notify
the USS, which in turn have to notify affected users. The USSs can help the operator to track the aircraft and plan
a safe alternative volume contract to follow without affecting other aircraft [2].
Failures in protocol: In our protocol, we handle violations of contracts similar to UTM. These violations can
be caused by aggressive maneuvers an agent chooses to do as described in the previous section, or because of any
kind of failures, such as software or hardware ones, that can occur to the agent. The agents themselves report their
violations of contracts to the airspace manager AM. In their reports, they send alternative, or recovery, contracts
that they are expected to follow after the violations. When AM receives a violation report with the recovery contract
rec contri from agent i, AM replaces its saved contract contr arr[i] with rec contri. Moreover, AM notifies
the agents with contracts in contr arr that intersect with rec contri to alert them of the potential collision
danger.
Experimental results and analysis: We implemented the violation detection and mitigation mechanism ex-
plained above in our framework. We tested our monitoring implementation in CORRIDOR scenarios with four and
six drones. We used the CONSERVATIVE strategy to create operation volume. From Table I, we can see that there
are zero violations of the contract. This ensures that the violations are not because of maneuvers chosen by the
agents, but because of failures simulation as we will discuss next. This allows for a better comparison of the results
under differ failure probabilities in Table II.
In order to generate violations that mimic faults in the aircraft, we generate fake waypoints outside the contracts.
Whenever an agent reaches a waypoint in its path, we flip a biased coin with a head probability of 0.4 or 0.9. This
head probability represents the failure probability. If the toss is a tail, we provide it with the exact next waypoint
next wp in the path to follow. If it is a head we create a noisy version of next wp by adding independent Gaussian
noise with mean zero and standard deviation five to each of the three dimensions of next wp. An agent i ∈ ID
checks if its position and time is in its volume contract regularly. Whenever it recognizes it violated it, it generates its
recovery contract rec contri using waypoints2contract with arguments being its current position, current
time, and the list of waypoints in the path that have not been visited yet. It sets plan contri and curr contri
to rec contri and sends the latter to AM to update contr arr[i] accordingly.
The results of our monitoring experiments are shown in Table II. In addition to the average response time per
agent (Resp. T. (s)), the number of rectangles per second in OVCs which AM has to check the disjointness of
(#Rect/s), and the violation rate (%F), we report the number of alert notifications sent to agents per violation
(#notif./F). We repeated each experiment five times and took the average of their results.
As expected, the percentage of violations %F increases as the probability of failure increase. Moreover, the
number #notif./F seems independent of the number of drones and the number of failures. This is because the
number of notifications sent depends on the number of surrounding agents that might be affected by an agent’s
violation of contract. If more air-vehicles are added to a scenario, but the number of those that are close to each
other remained the same, the number of notifications per violation would not be affected. This is the case in the
CORRIDOR scenario, where there are at most two close air-vehicles at any time independent of the total number
of air-vehicles. Closeness of air-vehicles in turn depends on the severity of the considered failures and the extent
of contract violations before recovery. Such extent is determined in our experiments by the mean and the variance
of the added Gaussian noise to the waypoints. Table II uses the same Gaussian distribution to generate noise. We
leave such comparison for future investigation. With more number of violations, more checks have to be done by
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AM to know which agents should be sent alerts. This is can be seen in Table II by comparing the average response
time Resp. T.(s) of the scenarios with failure probability 0.4 and those with 0.9. The latter are significantly larger
than the former. Lastly, as the number of air-vehicles increase, #Rect/s increases because of the increasing number
of needed checks done by the airspace manager.
Finally, our framework allows also for violations monitoring by the airspace manager. This monitoring can be a
similar, but centralized approach, of what the agents do of checking inclusion of their position-time pairs in their
contracts. Or, it can be based on forecast to the future using simulation forward or reachability analysis to predict
violations of contracts.
VII. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
UTM technologies conceptualized by NASA and FAA can transform and benefit a number of aspects of society.
Some of the proposed concepts and operations were successfully field tested in the Summer of 2019, and now
there is a strong need for formal safety analyses and larger scale empirical evaluations. In this paper, we present an
executable formal model of UTM operations and study its safety, scalability, and performance. Our formal analyses
illustrate how formal reasoning can be applied to the family of UTM de-conflicting protocols. We also presented
an open and flexible reference implementation of this protocol in a simulator. Our experiments suggest, perhaps
unsurprisingly, that the computation load on the airspace manager scales linearly with the number of participating
agents. The simulator also makes it possible to study different strategies for blocking operating airspace volumes.
For example, compared to a conservative strategy our aggressive strategy provides 1.5-3X speedup, but it also leads
to 2-5X higher workload on the airspace manager, and up to 10% more violations.
We showed how violations can be handled through reporting to the airspace manager, alerting possibly affected
agents, and re-planning with new contracts. We demonstrated a simple technique to induce failures following given
probabilities by adding waypoints. We presented experimental results that show how the workload on the airspace
manager increase with increasing probability of failure due to additional communication. Our preliminary result
further showed that the safety or performance is more correlated with the planned paths of each air-vehicle than
the total number of air-vehicle in the airspace, and we suspect that the intersections between paths is a more
dominant factor than the density of air-vehicles in the air-space, and further experiment with finer data and metrics
for measuring paths are in our future plan.
Some of the simplifying assumptions made in this work can be removed with careful engineering, while others
require brand new ideas. Handling timing and positioning inaccuracies, heterogeneous vehicles, fall in the first
category. While development of predictive failure detection and failure mitigation strategies, incorporation of human
operators, and fall in the latter category.
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